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Introduction: Maastricht and Defense

The Maastricht Treaty, negotiated in 1991 and signed in the first quarter of 1992,
placed defense on the list of future competences for the European Union (EU).· Two
competing visions of the so-called European Security. and Defense Identity (ESDI)
characterized the political debate at that time. One group of states, 111ost forcefully
represented by the United Kingdom, advocated a quasi-autonomous· European
.

.

.

defense capability firmly wedded to NATO, with the Western European Union
(WEU) serving as the European pillar of the Atlantic. Alliance.

The second.

perspective, advanced by France with strong German support, anticipated a need for
. independent .European defense· capabilities, again attached to WEU, the latter
earmarked for eventual incorporation into the institutional machinery of the EU.

The resulting document was a somewhat watered-down compromise which~ in its
most substantive points, owed more to British input than French or German.
Admittedly, the Maastricht Treaty's references to defense broke new ground
(previous treaties generally avoided the subject), and there is no doubt that by
signing the document Britain made an important symbolic concession to France and
Germany.

However, the treaty commitments were vague, no definite timetable for

a merger between the WEU and EU was outlined, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) primacy was acknowledged, and the European Council,
.

.

along with the national veto, was accorded the role of gatekeeper to the EU's.overall
evolution.1

It was obvious that ESDI, or at least an ESDI that was capable of

duplicating most of the functions performed by NATO, was not in the cards for the
foreseeable future.2

1

Four years later one may reasonably ask ifESDI's prospects are any better. Equally
reasonably, one may conclude that the answer to that question is no.

As far as is

known by this writer, no formal definition of EU security and defense interests has
been articulated, aside from the now somewhat dated Hague Platform of 1987 and
various. general statements emanating from WEU ministerials.

Given this, it is

difficult to specify ESDI's nature in advance, although two distinct models can be
delineated. Europeans must choose either a supranational or an intergovernmental
political format for ESDI. · They

must also determine an acceptable level of

operational independence, either by eliminating current dependencies on NATO
and the U.S., or by fine-tuning the relationship between NATO and ESDI such that
NATO's military assets are permanently double-hatted (that is, equally available to
the Atlantic Alliance and the Europeans' military arm).

On both counts, however,

proponents of a regional approach to defense are likely to be disappointed.
A full-blown "Unionist" model remains a thing of fantasy. As matters stand, it is
inconceivable that national governments would form supranational agencies to
manage a .c·ommon European defense effort.

ESDI's development to date has been

politically determined on an intergovernmental basis, and at present Britain, among
other states, has refused WEU-EU association by opposing any attempt to make
WEU answerable to the European Council.
account for inertia on this matter.

Institutional rivalries also help to

Worries concerning WEU's relationship to

NATO have often been expressed on both sides of the Atlantic, while internal
disagreement over Europe's defense needs continues to have· a negative impact.
Traditionally~ the key disputes have taken place between the United Kingdom and
France.

Currently, France and Britain are attempting to develop a common

understanding on several defense problems, but in effect this only means that
France has moved closer to British views (on NATO's primacy, on the merits of all- volunteer armies, and on the need for improved rapid response capabilities), in
some measure at the expense of the Franco-German relationship, as discussed
below.

French President Jacques Chirac has even accelerated France's
2

rapprochement with NATO, acknowledging both the -need for American
involvement in European security and the very limited possibilities for ESDI at a
time when monetary union is at the top of the EU's agenda. 3
ESDI's evolution has also been structurally inhibited by the fiscal crises which are
plaguing most of the EU's member states and _the tremendous costs involved in
acquiring independent operational capacities.4 European governments cann~t offer'
a compelling rationale for increased defense expenditures at the present time, but
even if they could, political willingness to substantially increase the share of GDP
devoted to defense cannot be assumed. Inflation rates for military production far
outpace the rest of the economy, and given the emphasis on technological
advancement, this problem will endure.

European governments have soµght

refuge in collaborative development and production, and they have also made
some attempts to ensure that national forces can work in a complementary and
mutually reinforcing manner under multinational command.

However, these

sorts of activities are not exclusively European, and therefore cannot be viewed as
automatically creating the groundwork for an independent ESDI (though they may
eventually make contributions to this end).

Many of the most important

collaborative defense-industrial activities involve the United States with one or
more European partners (for example, the MLRS battlefield rocket system which
enjoys the status of a major NATO programme), and American technical leads in a
variety of areas suggest that the Europeans will not wish, nor be able to, change the
situation.

Not surprisingly given America's overwhelming conventional

superiority, especially with respect to interventionary forces, most of the integrated
force planning that has taken place since 1990 has occurred under NATO. Further,
the allies have generally agreed on various -non-proliferation and counterproliferation measures for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems,
and it seems unlikely that an easy justification, either political or budgetary, could be
found for an ESDI with a nuclear component other than that provided by Britain
and France.
3

Recognizing the political and economic benefits which accrue from international
defense and security collaboration, some American elites within the foreign policy
and academic establishments are promoting cooperative security as a guide to
'

'

'

'

coordinating western policies in the years ahead. If this broad concept is properly.
implemented (at least within NATO), it will permanently alter the basic character of·
ESDI. . Cooperative security necessitates national military role speci~lization,
political risk sharing, and operational burden sharing. 5 Under these constraints,
ESDI is likely to be designed as an integral part of a larger defensive and security
system which will include the U.S..

If ESDI is so configured,. there will be no.

pressing need to duplicate NATO,.unless the alliance itself proves untenable or falls
victim to a serious deterioration in tran~-Atlantic relations.6

In the near future,

ESDI is likely to remain materially impoverished, separate. from the EU, and ·
dependent on an intergovernmental political process which permits dissenting
states to thwart the aspirations of any majority coalition. The following pages
attempt to provide a justification for these claims, while also bringing the reader up
to date on the state of play in the issue-area of European defense and defense
cooperation.
Defense and Security

While often, and incorrectly, treated as one and the same thing,

defense and .

security are conceptually distinct, as noted by Barry Buzan.7 Security is, to use a well
known phrase, an "essentially contested" concept, and is laden with inherent
contradictions (for example, the so-called security dilemma where one state's
defense expenditures stimulate like actions ·on the part of another state, creating
greater insecurity for both sides). Defense, conceptually speaking, is related to
national security in much the same way as insurance is related to personal
economic security.

States accept the costs of defense as individuals shoulder the

burden of home insurance. The p;obability of calamity may be low, but it is best to
4

prepare for such an eventuality. Three areas interlock to create the defense issuearea: production of equipment and provision of armed forces, force posture, and
use of armed forces. 8 Working from this definition, one may proceed to outline the
basic characteristics of the European defense effort, highlight current problems and
areas of progress, and make predictions as to future outcomes.

European Defense Production: National Champions, Cross-National Mergers, and
the American Menace.

If Europe is to effectively provide for its own defense, it will most certainly need a

defense-industrial establishment which is largely self-sufficient and able to develop
the sorts of technologies which· will keep Europe in the· forefront of the military .
technology race. The alternative, dependence upon the USA as a supplier of major
and sub-systems, is not a preferable option for two reasons. First, the defenseindustrial sector is a major source of employment, and through exports provides a
means of political influence abroad. · Secondly, states which opt for imports over
domestic production become vulnerable to disruptions in supply (for example, of
spare parts) and therefore in turn become politically vulnerable to the whims of the .
supplier state.

Thus, although European governments ·have sought to retain access

to the American equipment market and are often keen collaborators in NATO-wide
technology development projects, most have attempted to protect their defenseindustrial sectors from domination by American concerns (partially by allowing the
development of national champions in high-technology areas like aerospace,
partially by a series of formal and informal r~les which favor domestic suppliers
. over foreign ones, and partially by aggressive promotion of exports, sometimes
involving direct government-to-government financing).
Yet these measures have at best been only moderately successful. For roughly thirty
· years European governments have been worried that their· relatively small defense5

industrial sectors could be swamped by unrestrain~d American competition: such
· worries prompted the formation of Eurogroup and the Independent European
Programme Group (the first now disbanded, the second absorbed within WEU).
Traditionally, Europe has been plagued by duplication of research and development
(R&D} efforts,

undue fragmentation of industry in a context where national

procurement has not been able to provid_e economies of· scale, and an inability to
match American innovation in the area of· Emerging Technologies.9 · Today, the ·
WEU has an armaments secretariat, while Britain, France and Germany are
members of the so-called European Armaments Agency, a body which seeks to
increase. efficiency in procurement and to foster_ pan-"European_ defense
collaboration. 10 · Additionally, European firms, in order to offset development costs,
create economies of scale, improv~ project management skills, share risks, and
indeed stay alive. in some fields, have been willing to form joint ·ventures and tag-,
team on bids. 11

These activities_ have been promoted by national governments,

with the Franco-German relationship being the key stone of any future panEuropean defense-industrial system.
Multilateralism has had some notable results.

The Tornado fighter aircraft has

ultimately become a commercial success, as well as a service standard for the armed
forces of Italy, Britain, and -Germany, the.countries which developed it._ The followon system, the very costly European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), is now airborne, and has
recovered from its near-death experience of· 1992 when Germany threatened to
abandon the project for cheaper alternatives.

Yet despite these success stories,

collaborative ventures of this type are often very expensive and politically
vulnerable. European states are notorious for putting national interests ahead of
"European" .interests when it comes to defense procurement. The rule seems to be
to give preference to national suppli-ers where possible, and in the case of J3ritain, to
place a premium on cost, rather_ than grand political designs, when taking
procurement decisions (for example, the extremely unpopular. British decision to .
purchase American Apache attack helicopters in preference to the Franco-German
6

Tiger system).

Additional
pressures stemming from attempts
to meet European
.
.

Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criteria . are also negatively impacting
European defense-industrial collaboration since defense spending is. discretionary
and therefore a target for finance ministries.

The German defense budget has again

been lowered (the 1997 budget sets military expenditure_s at DM46.6bn; _down from a
little over DM47bn for 1996) and several European collaborative projects. appear to .
be in jeopardy.12 · The German government Was particularly displeased with the cuts
made in the French budget earlier this year, some of which fell disproportionately
on Franco-German collaborative projects such as the Tiger attack helicopter , and
Bonn is at the time of writing extremely anxious to receive some type of French
commitment to the NH-90 helicopter among other programs.1 3

Following hot on

· the heels of President Chirac's decision to end conscription, the French cuts were
clearly designed to favor domestic manufacturers such as Dassault, producer of the
Rafale fighter which is amo_ng EFA's primary competitors in world export
markets.1 4

Although neither Paris nor Bonn wish to be blamed for the collapse of

any one of several important projects, casualties are likely, and it appears that
development on the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) is to be slowed down._ For those
who seek European. operational independence this is catastrophic news: . air lift,
along with satellite capabilities, was identified by WEU leaders as an area where ·
Europe needed to make progress if ESDI was to be anything more than a slogan.15
.

.

.

.

For countries like Britain and France, which depend heavily on exports to prop up ·
domestic· industry, intra-European competition is another sore point, weakening
'..

'

· Europe's overall position relative to that of the U.S. which has dominated arms
export markets since the end of the Cold War. The case of main battle tanks is
especially illustrative of Europe's problems. Europe currently builds three types of
tank, the Challenger (U.K.), the Le Clerc (France) and the Leopard II (Ge!many).
Each of these vehicles is marketed for export, both within and without. Europe.
While the Leopard series has been an export success witllin Europe, the British and
French have generally compete.cl for. _sales in the Third Wo.rld, especially in the
lucrative Middle Eastern market. Unfortunately, both Challenger II and Le Clerc are
7

expensive when compared to the American MlAl/2, a consequence_of the-fact that
the European designs have been ordered by their host_ governments in very small
numbers despite heavy R&D outlays. Judged from a strategic European perspective,
.

•"

"

this internal competition is d~leterious: Europe should design and b~ild one type of
tank, and should by doing so obtain lower unit costs_.. Judged from a national
perspective, however, the los~ of -relative autonomy_ in this sector is unacceptable as
are the job losses which would attend rationalization of the Europ.ean · milit~ry
vehicles market. - The tension between national and European_ interests is the
principal contradiction within ESDI. If Europe is to have a defense identity, this
perforce must come at the expense of short-term national interests. So long as
.. fragmentation and national egoism remain the rule,· however, Europe's_ strategic
placement is likely to be compromised.
In short, what is needed is a thorough rationalization of the European defense
.industrial sector. States must be prepared to reinforce their comparative ·advantages
within the framework of an integrated multinational system of production, but the
transition costs could well be prohibitively high. Under· current circumstances, for
example, it is difficult to conceive of ~ British government abandoning armored
vehicle production (or a German government terminating aircraft production) inthe interests of European unity, even though such a move could well make sense
from a pan-European perspective.
Conventional Force Posture: WEU, NATO and Crisis Management

In addition to the need for rationalization of defonse production and procurem~nt,
.

.

ESDI requires a specific concept for the employment of conventional armed forces,
as well as properly provisioned units · to implement it.

Neither.- of· these·

requirements has to date been met. While the end of the ,cold War forced a general
rethinking of the role and structure of western conventional, forces, only NATO,
spurred on by the Americans, has taken. practical steps to shape forces _to the .
8

demands of a more multipolar world .. WEU, by contrast, has done little beyond·
registering doctdnal agreement with the· senior alliance and working on ways to
"borrow" NATO assets for European military operations.
In July of 1990, NATO ministers attending the London conference established a
Strategy Review Group (SRG) which was taske9. with redefining· alliance doctrines
and operational concepts. France participated in the work of the SRG from February
of 1991.16 By May of that year, the North Atlantic Council had agreed to a new force
posture for the alliance which was designed to allow NATO to perform various
crisis management roles in theaters as far afield as the Middle East, the
Mediterranean littoral, and Eastern Europe. While the ability to reconstitute· 1arge
ground forces was maintained (through Main Defense and Augmentation Forces),
NATO's highest readiness commands, the Rapid Reaction units, have taken on the appearance of interventionary forces, rather than assets which are designed for

In developing these

effective territorial defense against the now-defunct USSR.

forces, NATO leaders were cognizant of the need to maintain the alliance's political
cohesion: · thus, the eight divisions theoretically available to the Rapid Reaction
Corps are drawn from several national orders of battle, most of which are European. ·
Moreover, the unit types differ. Some divisions are heavy mechanized formations,
others are .lighter and more easily-deployable in poor terrain. Multinationalism has
therefor been combined with flex1bility_ in unit composition to create forces which
conceivably can meet the requirements of most plausible crisis management
-

.

scenarios.

·.

.

.

Finally, the Rapid Reaction forces are highly mobile, and different force

packages can be assigned a wealth of combat ai; support, air lift, and ~ther ·
NATO/US assets (such as airborne w·arning and control aircraft) within a concept
which accentuates the importance of military ·role ·specialization. · The resulting
.

.

.

force posture permits NATO to perform two of the core functions identified at the
Rome Summit in November 1991: promotion of a stable security environment in
Europe; and preparation for Article Four, or out-of-area,. missions subject to the
unanimous approval of NATO member states.1 7
9

It is important to note that national force reductions were in part guided by the
change ·in alliance doctrines.

Although America~ force levels were drastically

'

reduc~d, the residual forces left in Europe were designed to participate in alliance
I

-

task f9rces (for example, USAF air capabilities take the form of "composite" wings
which!mix air lift, tanker, ·and-combat assets in self-contained air groups which seem
!

.

desi~ed to ,provide comprehensive air support for the ground force components of.
alliance task forces).18

Similarly, the United Kingdom reduced her overall

contripution to NATO force pools, but structured her
divisi~ms for participation in the Rapid Reaction Corps.

remaining two army
France under Chirac has

'

also b,egun the process of restructuring her armed forces, placing emphasis upon an
all-vo~unteer military which is less cumbersome than the previous conscript-based
'

-

.

force /and which is more suitecl to cooperation with allies in crisis management
tasks.:
'

i

-

Leaders of the Atlantic Alliance also welcomed the development of the European
Secur!ity and defense· Identity _at the Rome Summit of November 1991, and they
looke:d forward to closer working relationships between the WEU and NAT0.19
Operating in the shadow of its more powerful sister, the WEU. has also been
primirily concerned with problems pertaining to force projection and in this sense
'

there; is little doctrinal divE:rgence between the two alliances.

The Petersberg

decla:ration of 1992 anticipated that WEU forces would perform limited contingency
I

oper~tions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief ·at the request of the
I

.

.

-

-

Org~nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). · WEU leaders also
I

iden~ified specific shortfalls in capabilities for these tasks. The Vianden ministerial
Gun~ 1991) produced a~ agreement to establish _a satellite. data_ interpretation center
at T;orrejon, Spain, and subsequent ministerials identified the need for an
.

r

.

oper:ational satellite capability _2o A WEU Rapid Reaction Force has also been
'

discyssed since 1991 when the WEU Assembly commissioned.a feasibility study on
this subject. Any WEU operation, however, would most likely draw on assets from
l.

[._

i

10

NATO force pools. In November of 1993, the WEU formally requested the use of
NATO resources in the areas of command and control, intelligence gathering, and
headquarters units, and as matters have developed it seems likely that WEU access
to these resources would only be permitted under the Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) ·concept first articulated in January of 1994 and discussed further below.
Additionally, many conceivable WEU operations would require access to American
air lifting assets since these types of resources are in short supply in European
inventories. WEU may also have to draw on NATO's combat ground forces for all
but the smallest military operations.

In November 1993, WEU ministers, meetm.g

at Luxemburg, identified the following Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU): the
Eurocorps, the Multinational Division (Central), and the U.K./Netherlands
Amphibious Force.

Of these units, the. Anglo-Dutch force is at a high level of

· combat readiness.

The Eurocorps, by contrast, suffers from a number of

shortcomings. While identified as the nucleus of a future European army, the
Eurocorps has difficulties pertaining to deployability
(the shortage of lifting assets ·
'
.

mentioned above) and command and control (a consequence of the fact that the
constituent units--French, German,
languages).

and Spanish among others--speak different

Moreover, WEU has little in the way of infrastructure to support

overseas military adventures,· and in this fundamental sense is dependent upon the
wealth of resources built up jointly by NATO members over the years.
The immediate future for ESDI does not look rosy.

As noted above, there are

several structural deficiencies with the WEU, and these cast doubt on the alliance's
ability to perform even the Petersberg tasks, much less go beyond them, an objective
recently articulated by the French. 2 1

At root, the problem is financial.

The

. conte~porary rash of defense budget cuts across Europe augurs ill for key projects
such as the FLA and Helios satellite, and Europe, collectively, does not have the
political will and economic resources to compensate for the trans-Atlantic defen~e
technology gap (for example, in the areas of electronic warfare and battlefield
management systems), a situation which implies continued operational dependence
11

upon America. Thus, second order concerns (that is, technical and financial) are
affecting the evolution and level of independence of ESDI and with it the nature
and institutional identity of the entire European project. Nowhere is this more
apparent than with respect to the development of the CJTF concept.
Originally conceived of as a means ·to iµiprove NATO's ability to manage crisis
responses, the CJTF idea has become something of a political football, since the·
terms under which Europe can make use of these NATO resources has been hotly
disputed. The _CJTF concept has been defined as "a multinational, multiservice, tasktailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-NATO forces capable of rapid
deployment to conduct limited duration operations ·beyond Alliance borders, under
the control of either NATO's integrated military structure or the Western E_uropean
Union". 2 2

The key

bone of contention concerns the precise terms of WEU' s

political control over a CJTF operation. As originally advanced by the Americans,
any CJTF would be subject to political oversight by NATO ministerial bodies, which ·
of course meant that the USA would have political influence over the course of any
"European" operation. 23 France, which has traditionally asserted that NATO needs
to become a more flexible instrument and one less dominated by the United States,
regarded this limitation as unreasonable and pushed the Americans towards a
looser arrangement which would permit exclusively European oversight. Meeting
in Berlin in June of 1996, France secured from the United States an agreement in
principle that the Europeans should enjoy "political control and strategic direction"
of WEU missions, but the Americans were insistent that the use of NATO forces in
such operations would require approval from all 16 NATO members and that
NATO has the right to keep under review the disposition of its assets for the
duration of WEU-led deployments. 24

Headquarters and command structures for

WEU operations were also identified.

However, while French leaders were

enthusiastic about the results of the Berlin conference, Britain's Foreign Minister,
_Malcolm Rifkind, took a more sanguine view, asserting that WEU operations
would be occasional and confined to low-level tasks such as search and rescue,
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humanitarian relief, and low-intensity peacekeeping.

More importantly, the

American position preserves the national veto, greatly limiting Western Europe's
freedom of choice.

Coupled with the limited capabilities of WEU, it seems

reasonable to conclude that France has in effect only secured agreement for smallscale, case-by-case WEU-led CJTF missions, not a foundation for future operational
independence for ESDI. 25

Finally, one may ask how serious the French are about European independence in
· defense matters when France herself is increasing her level of integration with
NATO.

Since former President Charles de Gaulle pulled French forces out of
.

-

NATO's integrated command in the 1960s, successive French governments have ..
progressively drawn the French military ever closer to_ their erstwhile NATO
partners.

French pragmatism has been particularly noticeable over the last three

years. In January of 1993, France and Germany spellE;?d out the conditions under·
which the Eurocorps could serve NATO, while the French-promoted rivalry
between NATO ar:id WEU in the Adriatic effectively came to an end in June of that
year when the two naval patrols were combined.26 France participated through 1994
iri NATO's Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) and over the course of
1993-94 established new military missions with NATO's three Major Subordinate
Commands (MSCs) responsible to the Supreme Allied Commanqer, Europe
(SACEUR), while in September of 1995 the first NATO exercise to be held on French
soil since 1965 took place.2 7 In December 1995, France rejoined NATO's Military
Committee, which she had left in 1966, and France also participates, on an informal
basis, in the work of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). 28 Additionally, ·
French troops have been placed under NATO command in Bosnia, as part of the
Implementation Force (IFOR) for the Dayton Accord.

Coupled with President

Chirac's radical reforms in the French force posture, it seems clear that ~ranee has
accepted that a truly independent ESDI is not likely, and that the best solution to the
problem of Europe's need_ for a political-military ·capability lies in cooperation with
NATO, no ~mall irony given France's traditionally suspicious and tense
13

relationship with America and the alliance.

Yet, irony notwithstanding, there has

been an element of consistency in the French position since WEU. was reactivated in
the early 1980s.

President Chirac made it clear that his" purpose in seeking

rapprochement with NATO was to promote the development of. a European
defense capability, albeit one -that is dependent upon the· Atlantic Alliance asc
opposed to separate from it, a goal held by previous French leaders.

Given the

political. and economic problems noted previously, there were. few other
alternatives.

The Use of Armed Forces since 1945: Past Trends, Future Prospects

Since 1945, European powers have been involved in a variety of military operations,
some stemming from post-colonial obligations (for example, frequent British and
French peacekeeping .operations in Africa and the the Far East), others taking the
form of attempts to hold on to former colonies (for example, Portuguese operations
in Africa), some incurred under obligation to the United Nations (for example, the
Korean and Bosnian cases); still others repres~nting militant defense of national
- interests ·(for example, the 1990-91 Gulf War).

In general, the power-projection

· capabilities of European powers have lessened over the years, partially as a
consequence of financial -pressures, but also because the decline of European
colonialism removed ·the rationale for large_.scale interventionary forces. Coupled
with the fact that, at least into the 1960s, American leaders frowned on European
neo-colonial adventures (for example, Suez in 1956), the -result of these
developments has been rising European dependence on the United States.

The_

Falklands war of 1982 could not have been successfully prosecuted by the British
without substantial American assistance, while France and Belgium have often
found that their military power can only be projected into Central Africa with the
cooperation of USAF military transports. 2 9 The Gulf War of 1990-91 re~ealed the
extent to which Europe has come to depend on the 'United States for effective overt
rri.1litary intervention abroad. Europe, more dependent on M1ddle Eastern oil than
America, contributed forces which, while substantial, were nonetheless a mere

14

fraction of the resources placed in theater by the Bush administration. The inability
of the United Kingdom and France to effect a ceasefire in Bosnia, and the success
registered by the USA when it took the lead in addressing this problem, further
underlines the extent of European dependence on North American military power.
As discussed in the preceding section, NATO/WEU
forces are configured for out-of.
.
_area, or Article Four, operations. As noted above, European powers generally lack
some of the key resources ·which permit effective and succ_essful military
interventions. Therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that for any but the most
small-scale deployments, Europe will be -obliged to cooperate with America.
National leaders on both sides of the Atlantic· seem to be aware of this. Chirac's
. apparent belief that an effective ESDI can be built by borrowing allied assets reflects a
realization that the alternative (national, and perhaps eventual EU self~sufficiency)
is practically out of the question, and enormous political benefit can be realized
through cooperation with the U.S., as, for example, in Bosnia. American Defense
Secretary William Perry has perhaps gone further_ than most in calling for an
explicit division of labor for out-of-area operations. In Perry's view, multinational
military

interventions will be most effective where role-specialization is highly

developed. The U.S., in Perry's estimation, can provide specific technologies for the ·
reconnaissance strike role (Stealth aircraft, Precision Guided Munitions, Command,
Control, Communications, Intelligence and Satellite capabilities, and appropriate
levels of air and sea lift in addition to combat air support), while other powers
(France, Russia, Germany and India are listed by Perry) could provide the lion's
share of ground troops, with traditional maritime powers (Brltain, Italy and Japan)
furnishing major rtaval forces for any allied expeditionary force. 3

°

Clearly,

heightened levels of western military--to-military cooperation ·are envisaged by
Perry, a logical consequence of the fact that current economic realities. preclude
single-state hegemonic global management, just as they inhibit national and
regional self-sufficiency for the Europeans.31

15

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conferences:· Can Progress Be Made?

1996 was supposed to be a year of momentous decisions, for the European Union
generally and for ESDI in particular.

On the table is the question of a :merger

between WEU and the EU, with the European Council serving as taskmaster for the
Union's military arm. Ho\\Tever, the IGCs got off to a less than auspicious start as
Britain, acting in protest over-the EU's worldwide ban on U.K. beef exports, brought
all early work to a halt. Currently, Britain holds the Presidency-of the WEU and has
signalled its opposition to an EU /WEU merger. Unless qualified majority voting is extended to the area of defense and security, there is little chance that pro-Union
states will be able to effect a change in the British position.
The U.K. government's attitude towards WEU, and defense policy more generally,
has been remarkably consistent over 'the years. In essence, the policy of the Thatcher
regime has been continued by the current Conservative government, and its key
features can briefly be listed: the primacy of NATO over any_ other alternative; WEU
independence from EU political authority; a preference for· pragmatic bilateralism
rather than commitment to fulfilling a grand blueprint for the European security
and defen~~ identity; and, a penchant for maintaining the "special relationship" _
_with the U.S. (which carries _with it the related concern th~t too g-reat a _display of
Europhoria will undermine Anglo-American entente).32

Britain has been willing

to consider means of, increasing its military cooperation with selected partners (for
example, the military-to-military relationship with France has recently- been
strengthened ·by the creation of a joint air training center and commitments to
bilateral defense-industrial projects).

Similarly, British objectives for the WEU

focus almost exclusively on improving WEU's operational capabilities (accelerating
work on strategic lift, development of an exercise policy, improving political control
through the development of a Situation Center, and clarifying the modalities
governing the WEU/NATO relationship) and related technical issues. 33 Beyond

16

that, however, the British government seems wedded to the view that encumbering
-the EU with decision making power for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) is at best premature, at worst entirely contradictory to the U.K.'s overall
·. approach to European politics, since a merger would ultimately entail complete
· surrender of national sovereignty in this sensitive issue-area.34

Even staunch advocates of European unity have come to. accept that formal
subordination of WEU to EU is highly improbable ..· British_ opposition necessarily
precludes this outcome, but the EU' s neutral members do not wish to be stampeded
into joining a military alliance. · If WEU is placed under the institution.al umbrella
of the Union, countries like Sweden and Austria will have to either choose military
.·

alignment or opt. out of the ·military side of CFSP and ESDI. .In the event that an opt
out is chosen, one has to ask how common the CFSP and its defense comp~nent .··
would be. A two-track approach, with some states outside of the CFSP, others·
participating in it, may be a useful way to fudge the issue temporarily, but it does not
provide a sure foundation for a truly regional security policy and defense effort.
Military obligations of participants to non-participants would be unclear,. and
attempts to define "European" interests as a foundation for· any EU force posture
would become even more complicated and abstract than at present. Moreover, so
long as the national veto is preserved, it is :difficult to foresee many circumstances
when the EU could effect a military operation: in ·this· sense, national sovereignty ..
will· probably impede collective military efficiency, unless radical political reform
takes place.35

Conclusion: Towards a Dependent ESDI?

ESDI .appears to have hit a brick wall.

Lacking a clear conceptual foundation,

national governments have not been able to do anything more than muddle
through with a limited number of bilateral and multilateral technical projects over
the last five years. As noted above, some such projects have been adversely affected
17

by larger problems (mostly budgetary) and more compelling political issues
(monetary union and the related issue of public sector debt control) ..Moreover, the
ba·sic dilemma of ESDI--should ESDI be supranational, and if so, at what cost to
national interests--remains unresolved. If European defense cooperation is to move
beyond intergovernmeritalism and bilateralism, it_ will require a clear philosophical
foundation, a sure institutional base, and_ enhanced military ·capabilities in specific
areas.

N_one of these requirements has y_et been met, despit~ bilateral efforts to·.

address common defense concepts and seek remedies for operational weaknesses.3 6
Under current circumstances, it seems safe to assume ·that Europe's fledgling.
security and defense identity will remain plagued by an inability to pose and answer·
primitive ·questions, much less muster the resources to· translate concept into
capability. As ESDI dev_elops, we may reasonably expect it to be shaped by the wider
.

.

.

.

needs of the trans-Atlantic defense community as _this is centred upon NATO. With.
these summary comments in mind, the following short-term predictions can be
made.

will continue to

First, and to repeat the point, "Europe's" defense and security policy

be determined by an intergovernmental political process for several years to come.
Although one does not expect a merger between the WEU :and EU in the immediate
future, if problems pertaining to the status of EU neutrals can be worked out, and if
British objections can be over~ome, the European Council may ultimately become
the decision-making body for WEU. In this event, and assuming extension of QMV
_to CFSP-related issues, part of the groundwork would have been iaid for a regional
defense policy managed by a supranational institution.
Second, one should expect piecemeal progress. on specific operational difficulties, .
and further conso_lidation of Europe's defense-industrial base. Most of th_is activity
'

'

· will be bilateral, or confined to sub-groups of the EU-15. Further, improvements in
European force capabilities will probably be partially determined by NATO's needs,
as European governments will continue to depend on the· Atlantic Alliance for

18

territorial defense and large-scale power projection.
Third, and finally, WEU's access to. NATO assets for military operations not
involving the U.S. will have to be guaranteed, and several key inter-alliance issues
\

(for example, the level of host-nation support provided by non-WEU NATO
members for WEU operations) will require clarification.

WEU leaders can be.

expected to make progress on meeting operational needs for the tasks outlined in
the Petersberg declaration, but fundamental dependencies on the U.S. and NATO
will not be eliminated, and economic considerations suggest that these
dependencies may indeed be reinforced in the years ahead.
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